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Abstract - Smart cards have been used for many different purposes over the last two decades, from 
simple prepaid credit counter cards used in parking meters, to high security identity cards intended 
for national ID programs. This has increased data privacy and security requirements. Data protection 
and authentication is now demanded for performing Electronic payment and allow secure multi-level 
access to private information. ECC uses smaller key sizes compared to traditionally used RSA based 
cryptosystems. Elliptic Curve Cryptography is especially suited to smart card based message 
authentication because of its smaller memory and computational power requirements than public key 
cryptosystems. It is observed that the performance of ECC based approach is significantly better 
than RSA and DSA/DH based approaches because of the low memory and computational 
requirements, smaller key size, low power and timing consumptions. 
Keywords : symbolic Elliptic Curve Cryptography, finite fields, smart cards, Biometrics. 
GJCST Classification: C.3 
 
A Survey of Elliptic Curve Cryptography Implementation Approaches for Efficient Smart Card Processing  
 
 
 
Strictly as per the compliance and regulations of: 
 
 
 ©2011 Global Journals Inc.  (US) 
G
l
o
b
a
l
 
J
o
u
r
n
a
l
 
o
f
 
 
R
e
s
e
a
r
c
h
 
E
n
g
i
n
e
e
r
i
n
g
 
 
 
 
 
 
V
o
l
u
m
e
 
X
I
 
I
s
s
u
e
 
I
I
 
V
e
r
s
i
o
n
 
I
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
M
a
r
c
h
 
2
0
1
1
 
999 
 
  
A Survey of Elliptic Curve Cryptography 
Implementation Approaches for Efficient Smart 
Card Processing 
Jayabhaskar Muthukuruα, Prof. Bachala SathyanarayanaΩ 
Abstract - Smart cards have been used for many different 
purposes over the last two decades, from simple prepaid 
credit counter cards used in parking meters, to high security 
identity cards intended for national ID programs. This has 
increased data privacy and security requirements. Data 
protection and authentication is now demanded for performing 
Electronic payment and allow secure multi-level access to 
private information. ECC uses smaller key sizes compared to 
traditionally used RSA based cryptosystems. Elliptic Curve 
Cryptography is especially suited to smart card based 
message authentication because of its smaller memory and 
computational power requirements than public key 
cryptosystems. It is observed that the performance of ECC 
based approach is significantly better than RSA and DSA/DH 
based approaches because of the low memory and 
computational requirements, smaller key size, low power and 
timing consumptions.   
Keywords : Elliptic Curve Cryptography, finite fields, 
smart cards, Biometrics. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
mart card is a credit-card sized plastic card with 
an embedded computer chip. Smart cards play 
an increasingly important role in everyday life. We 
encounter them as credit cards, loyalty cards, electronic 
purses, health cards, and as secure tokens for 
authentication or digital signatures. Their small size and 
the compatibility of their form make them ideal carriers 
of personal information such as secret keys, passwords, 
customization profiles, and medical emergency 
information. Electronic Payment is one of the most 
widely used applications of the smart card and is the 
most familiar among the average user. There are several 
different types of smart cards in this category, all of 
which deal with currency or a fiscal value. Smart cards 
can provide multi-factor authentication by using 
PIN/Biometrics combination with the card.  
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verification and validation of a user identity using 
multiple authentication mechanisms. It often combines 
two or more authentication methods—for example, a 
three-factor authentication is based on password 
(Something you know), smart card (Something you 
have), and fingerprints (Something you are). For 
example, in addition to what the user knows (such as a 
PIN), the card can provide authentication using the card 
owner’s digital certificate with the card owner’s public 
key. The digital certificate associates the card owner’s 
identity to the person’s public key. The smart card also 
contains the card owner’s private key, which can be 
used for digitally signing e-mail or documents. With the 
support of biometric technologies, the smart card can 
also be used to store biometric templates of the card 
owner, which can be used to verify the card owner by 
acquiring a biometric sample (such as a fingerprint) and 
matching it to the reference template stored
 
on the card 
or off the card using a biometric authentication server. 
Using biometric templates can be considered for 
security-sensitive applications where PINs can be stolen 
[1]. Unlike standard public-key methods that operate 
over integer fields, the elliptic curve cryptosystems 
operate over points on an elliptic curve. Cryptographic 
algorithms based on discrete logarithm problem can be 
efficiently implemented using elliptic curves [21]. ECC is 
emerging as an attractive public-key cryptosystem for 
smart cards because compared to traditional 
cryptosystems like RSA/DH, it offers equivalent security 
with smaller key sizes, faster computation, lower power 
consumption, as well as memory and bandwidth 
savings [2]. 
 
II.
 
SMART
 
CARD
 
&
 
ARCHITECTURE
 
Smart cards come in two varieties: memory and 
microprocessor. Memory cards simply store data and 
can be viewed as a small floppy disk with optional 
security. A microprocessor card, on the other hand, can 
add, delete and manipulate information in its memory
 
on 
the card. Similar to a miniature computer, a 
S 
© 2012 Global Journals Inc.  (US)
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Multi-factor authentication approach is 
recommended in which security requirements are 
intended for highly secure installation and mandate a 
robust solution. Multi-factor authentication ensures 
microprocessor card has an input/output port operating 
system and hard disk with built-in security features.
a) Contact Vs. Contactless
Smart cards have two different types of 
interfaces: contact and contactless. Contact smart 
  
 
  
cards are inserted into a smart card reader, making 
physical contact with the reader. However, contactless 
smart cards have an antenna embedded inside the card 
that enables communication with the reader without 
physical contact. A combi card combines the two 
features with a very high level of security.
 
b)
 
Basic
 
Smart
 
Card
 
Chip
 
Architecture
 
The basic smart
 
card architecture is shown on 
Figure 1. It is a complete set of a microcontroller. It is a 
small embedded computer with low processing power
 
(8-bit CPU, 5 MHz clock) and small memory (4 Kb RAM, 
16 Kb EEPROM, 64 Kb ROM).It is secure and 
inexpensive
 
[20].
 
 
Fig.1
 
:
 
Basic Smart card Chip Architecture
 
Smart card components are:
 
CPU (Central Processing Unit):
 
The heart of the 
chip, all computational work like implementing 
cryptographic algorithms and data exchange goes via 
this function. 
 
Test Logic:
 
A
 
verification function only used 
during the production process to test all internal circuits 
for manufacturing faults.
 
Security Logic:
 
A
 
continuous function that 
checks environmental conditions that could jeopardise 
the security of the smart
 
card.
 
I/O Interface:
 
A
 
communication function that 
takes care of receiving external commands and sending 
back responses using a serial communication protocol.
 
ROM:
 
The permanent memory of the chip. It 
can contain parts of the operating system and self test 
procedures.
 
RAM:
 
The CPU’s scratch pad memory. This is 
used for storing temporary or intermediate data like 
session keys, internal variables and stack data. 
 
EEPROM:
 
Non-volatile updateable memory. It is 
used for storing application data like keys, PINs, 
balances, phone numbers, Biometric template and 
sometimes application or even operating system code.
 
Data Bus:
 
The transfer channel within the chip. 
All information exchanged between the various functions 
passes through this channel.
 
III.
 
BIOMETRIC
 
AUTHENTICATION
 
Biometric technique is an automated 
methodology for the recognition of a person based on 
behavioral or physiological characteristics. These 
characteristics include features such as hand geometry, 
handwriting, face, fingerprints, vein, voice, retina, and 
iris. Biometric technologies are now the key to an 
extensive array of highly secured identification and 
personal verification solutions. Biometric system is a 
pattern recognition technology that makes personal 
identification of an individual by determining the 
authenticity of a specific physiological or behavioral 
characteristics possessed by the user [3].
 
a)
 
Biometric Based Implementation on Smart Card
 
The use of biometrics within the card itself will 
mean that biometric features (fingerprint, retina, voice 
etc) can reliably identify a person. The use of some of 
these features has already been implemented in many 
applications. Table 1 below gives the required bytes for 
various biometric types. Additional information about 
biometric technology and standards can be found from 
the following organizations: The Biometric Consortium 
(www.biometrics.org), International Biometric Industry 
Association (www.ibia.rg), or BioAPI Consortium 
(www.iapi com) [4].
 
Table 1:
 
No. of Bytes required for various Biometric 
systems
 
Biometric System
 
No. of Bytes 
Required
 
Finger scan
 
300-1200
 
Finger geometry
 
14
 
Hand geometry
 
9
 
Iris recognition
 
512
 
Voice verification
 
1500
 
Face recognition
 
500-1000
 
Signature verification
 
500-1000
 
Retina recognition
 
96
 
b)
 
Classification of Biometric Approaches
 
Main Biometric based smart card 
implementation approaches are "match-off-card" and 
"match-on-card".
 
Match-off-card:
 
For this type of implementation, 
the enrolled template is initially loaded onto the smart 
A Survey of Elliptic Curve Cryptography Implementation Approaches for Efficient Smart Card Processing
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card and then transferred from the smart card via either 
contact or contactless interface when requested by the 
external biometric system. The external equipment then 
compares a new live template of the biometric with the 
  
one retrieved from the smart card. This implementation 
clearly has some security risks associated with 
transmitting the enrolled template off of the smart card 
for every biometric comparison. Appropriate security 
measures should be implemented to ensure the 
confidentiality and integrity of the released template.
 
Match-on-card:
 
This implementation technique 
initially stores the enrolment template in the smart card’s 
secure memory. When a biometric match is requested, 
the external equipment submits a new live template to 
the smart card. The smart card then performs the 
matching operation within its secure processor and 
securely communicates the result to the external 
equipment. 
 
Biometric match-on-card approach can provide 
more private and secure identity verification system
 
compare to match-off-card approach [5].
 
V.
 
ELLIPTIC
 
CURVE
 
ARITHMETIC
 
Elliptic curves are not like an ellipse or curve in 
shape. They look similar to doughnuts. Geometrically 
speaking they somehow resemble the shape of torus, 
which is the product of two circles when projected in 
three-dimensional coordinates.
 
ECC makes use of 
elliptic curves in which the variables and coefficients are 
restricted to elements of a finite field. There are two 
families of elliptic curves defined for use in 
cryptography: prime curves defined over odd prime field 
FP
 
and binary curves defined over Galois field GF
 
(2m).
 
a)
 
Geometrical Definition of Point Addition and point 
Doubling using chord-and-tangent rule
 
For any two points P(x1, y1) ≠
 
Q(x2, y2)
 
on an 
elliptic curve, EC
 
group law point addition can be 
defined geometrically (Figure 2) as: “If we draw a line 
through P
 
and Q, this line will intersect the elliptic curve 
at a third point    
 
(-R). The reflection of this point about 
x-axis, R(x3, y3)
 
is the addition of P
 
and Q”.
 
 
Fig.2
 
:
 
Addition: R=P+Q
 
For P=Q, point doubling, geometrically (Figure 
3) if we draw a tangent line at point P, this line intersects 
elliptic curve at a point (-R). Then, R
 
is the reflection of 
this point about x-axis.
 
 
Fig.3
 
:
 
Doubling: R=P+P
 
b)
 
Point Multiplication
 
The dominant operation in ECC cryptographic 
schemes is point multiplication. This is the operation 
A Survey of Elliptic Curve Cryptography Implementation Approaches for Efficient Smart Card Processing
© 2012 Global Journals Inc.  (US)
G
lo
ba
l 
Jo
ur
na
l 
of
 C
om
pu
te
r 
Sc
ie
nc
e 
an
d 
T
ec
hn
ol
og
y 
 V
ol
um
e 
X
II
 I
ss
ue
  
I 
 V
er
si
on
 I
 
  
  
   
  
9
  
 Ja
nu
a r
y 
 2
01
2
which is the key to the use of elliptic curves for 
asymmetric cryptography---the critical operation which 
is itself fairly simple, but whose inverse (the elliptic curve 
discrete logarithm) is very difficult. ECC arranges itself 
so that when you wish to performance operation the 
cryptosystem should make easy encrypting a message 
with the public key, decrypting it with the private key the 
operation you are performing is point multiplication.
Scalar multiplication of a point P by a scalar k as being 
performed by repeated point addition and point 
doubling for example 7P=(2((2P)+P)+P.
c) Elliptic Curve Over FP and F2m
Definition of elliptic curve over FP as follows [6].
Let p be a prime in FP and a, b∈ FP such that 
4a3 + 27b2 ≠ 0 mod p in FP, then an elliptic curve E (FP) is 
defined as 
                   E (FP):= { p( x, y) , x, y ∈ FP }
Such that y2 = x3 + ax + b mod p together with a 
point O, called the point at infinity. Below is the definition 
of addition of points P and Q on the elliptic curve E (FP).
Let P(x1, y1) and Q(x2, y2) then
  
 
 
   
  
    
     
 
   
    
 
   
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                        
                        
 
The point p(x, -y) is said to be the negation of p(x, y). 
 
The elliptic curves over F2m
 
is defined as follows.
 
Denote the (non-super singular) elliptic curve over F2m
 
by
 
E (F2m). If a, b ∈
 
F2m
 
such that b ≠ 0 then 
 
E (F2m)
 
= {p(x, y),
 
x, y ∈
 
F2m
 
}
 
such that  y2
 
+ xy = x3
 
+ ax2
 
+ b ∈
 
FPm
 
together with a 
point O, called the point at infinity.
 
The addition of points on E (F2m)
 
is given as 
follows: Let P(x1, y1)
 
and Q(x2, y2) be points on the 
elliptic curve E(F2m),
 
then
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                              O               If x1 = x2 and y2 = − y1
  R= P+Q =          Q = Q+P   If P = O
               
                              (x3, y3 )        otherwise
Where                        
                        λ2 − x1 − x2   If P ≠ ±Q (Point Addition)
        x3   =                                    
                       λ2 − 2x1        If P = Q (Point Doubling)
  
    y3 = λ(x1 − x3) − y1, and  
  
                        y2 − y1           If P ≠ ±Q (Point Addition)
                                     x2 − x1    
      λ  =                                    
                      3x12 + a       If P = Q (Point Doubling) 
                         2y1
                            O                    If x1 = x2 and y2 =− y1
R = P+Q =         Q = Q+P      If P = O
                
                             (x3, y3 )           otherwise          
   
Where
                             
                   λ2+λ + x2 +x1 + a  If P ≠ ±Q (Point Addition)
       x3   =                                    
                   λ2 + λ + a             If P = Q (Point Doubling)
    y3  = λ ( x1 + x3 )+ x3 + y1     
and
                     y2 + y1                   If P ≠ ±Q (Point Addition)
                                  x2 + x1    
    λ  =                                    
                    x1   x1         If P = Q (Point Doubling)
                            y1
VI. ELLIPTIC CURVE CRYPTOGRAPHY FOR
MESSAGE AUTHENTICATION
The use of Elliptic Curve Cryptography was 
initially suggested by Neal Koblitz [7] and Victor S. Miller 
[8]. Elliptic curve cryptosystems over finite field have 
some advantages like the key size can be much smaller 
compared to other cryptosystems like RSA, Diffie-
Hellman since only exponential-time attack is known so 
far if the curve is carefully chosen [7] [6] and Elliptic 
Curve Cryptography relies on the difficulty of solving the 
Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem ECDLP, 
which states that, “Given an elliptic curve E defined over 
a finite field FP , a point P∈E (FP) of order n, and a point   
Q∈E (FP) , find the integer k ∈ [0,n −1] such that Q = k P. 
The integer k is called the discrete logarithm of Q to the 
base P, denoted k = logPQ”.
a) Elliptic Curve Encryption/Decryption
Consider a message ‘Pm’ sent from A to B. ‘A’ 
chooses a random positive integer ‘k’, a private key ‘nA’
and generates the public key PA = nA × G and produces 
the cipher text ‘Cm’ consisting of pair of points Cm = { 
kG , Pm + kPB } where G is the base point selected on 
the Elliptic Curve, PB = nB × G is the public key of B with 
private key ‘nB’.
To decrypt the cipher text, B multiplies the 1st 
point in the pair by B’s secret & subtracts the result from 
the 2nd point Pm + kPB – nB(kG) = Pm + k(nBG) – nB(kG) 
= Pm.
VII. VARIOUS ECC IMPLEMENTATION
APPROACHES ON SMART CARD
In [14] Ahmad Khaled M. AL-Kayali
demonstrated the advantages and disadvantages of 
using Prime/binary fields to implement ECC on smart 
cards. Prime fields are best for software applications 
where as Binary fields are suitable for Hardware 
applications [22]. To access remote information 
systems Password authenticated key agreement 
scheme [15] is very useful in limited computation and 
communication resource (smart card) environments. A 
two-phase authentication mechanism proposed [16] by 
Abhilasha, Anna Squicciarini, Elisa Bertino. In that first 
phase consists of a two-factor biometric authentication 
and  second phase combines several authentication 
factors in conjunction with biometric to provide a strong 
authentication. A key advantage of this approach is that 
any unanticipated combination of factors can be used. 
Disadvantage of using existing remote user 
authentication schemes [17] [18] is if the smart card is 
lost and password is revealed then any one can 
impersonate to sever as authorized user. To overcome 
this K K Goyal and M S Chahar proposed a new 
scheme [19] using Biometrics. Table 2 presents ECC
based implementations on Smart Card applications.
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Table 2 :   ECC implementation details on Smart Card
S.No Implementation Approach
Implemented  
Field
Aim/Impact
Implemented 
smart card 
model
1
Smart cards do not require coprocessor 
to execute arithmetic operations of ECC 
but RSA/DSA need additional on chip 
hardware to avoid long processing 
delays [11].
Binary Field Reduces the cost of Smart Card. 
Intel  8051 
microcontroller
2
ECC implementation, that relies on JAVA 
card technology and portable solution 
capable of running on PC and Smart 
card [12].
Binary Field
Implemented Efficient algorithms 
on low-resource smart cards.
Bull Odyssey I
3
Efficient implementation of the elliptic 
curve Digital Signature using optimized 
point addition and doubling algorithms 
when a crypto coprocessor for modular 
arithmetic is available [13].
Prime Field
ECDSA implementation is 
efficient compare with RSA and it 
has investigated curves over 
GF(p) because GF(2m) field is 
used for efficient hardware 
implementation.  
Motorola          M-
smart card Jupiter
a) Comparing ECC with other PKC Schemes
The majority of public key systems in use today 
use 1024-bit parameters for RSA and Diffie-Hellman. 
The US National Institute for Standards and Technology 
[NIST] has recommended that these 1024-bit systems 
are sufficient for use until 2010. Table 3 shows NIST 
guidelines on choosing computationally equivalent 
symmetric and public-key sizes [10]. 
Table 3 : Comparing ECC with other PKC schemes
S
ec
ur
ity
(b
its
)
R
S
A
 k
ey
 L
en
gt
h 
(b
its
)
E
C
C
 k
ey
 L
en
gt
h 
 (b
its
)
D
S
A
/D
H
 (b
its
)
K
e y
 S
iz
e 
R
at
io
 o
f R
S
A
 
an
d 
E
C
C
M
IP
S
 y
ea
rs
 to
at
ta
ck
P
ro
te
ct
io
n 
at
ta
ck
80 1024 160-223 1024 1:6 1012
Until 
2010
112 2048 224-255 2048 1:9 1024
Until 
2030
128 3072 256-383 3072 1:12 1028
Bey-
ond 
2031
192 7860 384-511 7860 1:20 1047
256 15360 512+ 15360 1:30 1060
ECC is the best suited in constrained 
environments. The advantages like speed and smaller 
keys or certificates are especially important in 
environments where at least one of the following 
resources is limited [9]: processing power, storage 
space, band width, or power consumption. This 
advantage is because its inverse operation gets harder, 
faster, against increasing key length than do the inverse 
operations in Diffie Hellman and RSA. 
Table4: Measured performance of public-key algorithms
ECC-
160
RSA-
1024
ECC-
192
RSA-
1536
ECC-
224
RSA-
2048
O
ps
/ 
se
c 271.3 114 268.5 36.4 195.5 17.8
P
er
fo
rm
a-
nc
e 
ra
tio
2.4 : 1 7.4 :1 11.4 : 1
K
ey
-s
iz
e 
ra
tio 1 : 6.4 1 : 8 1 : 9.1
Table 4 shows a comparison of the RSA and 
ECC cryptographic operations performed by an SSL 
server. Open SSL speed program is used to measure 
RSA decryption and ECDH operation for different key 
sizes (a minor enhancement was made for collecting 
RSA-1536 numbers). These micro-benchmarks highlight 
ECC’s performance advantage over RSA for different 
security levels. ECC’s performance advantage increases 
even faster than its key-size advantage as security 
needs increase [10].
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VIII. CONCLUSION
The smart card market has experienced a 
spectacular growth over the past few years. Along with 
their growing popularity there has been a corresponding 
growth of interest in their security. With respect to end-
to-end security no other security solutions nearly as 
good and affordable as smart cards exist. Elliptic curve 
cryptography has been emerged as a vast field of 
interest for application specific security requirements. 
The elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem makes 
ECC most efficient compared to earlier RSA/DSA 
algorithms. 
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